Euro-Mediterranean gas corridors and energy security

The gas effect — understood as the set of economic, energy and geopolitical transformations induced by the production, consumption and circulation of natural gas — does not unfold uniformly across the Euro-Mediterranean space. On the contrary, it produces differentiated effects depending on actors' positions in the energy chain — producers, transit states or consumers — and on their internal economic structures. In the case of Algeria, Tunisia and the European Union, it contributes to shaping contrasting yet deeply interdependent trajectories, revealing a geography of constraint and power.

Algeria: capacities near saturation in a model under tension

Algeria occupies a singular position in the Euro-Mediterranean gas economy, both as a strategic supplier and as an actor constrained by its own internal dynamics. Its natural gas production, estimated at between 95 and 105 billion m³ per year, places it among the world's leading producers, but this capacity must be analysed in light of structural constraints that limit its export potential.

The first of these constraints lies in the rapid growth of domestic consumption. It currently absorbs between 45 and 55 billion m³, that is to say nearly half of national production. This trend is explained by several converging factors. On the one hand, sustained and continuous demographic growth fuels increased energy demand. On the other hand, urbanisation and the gradual rise in living standards contribute to higher energy use, particularly in the residential and tertiary sectors. Finally, and most importantly, the very structure of the Algerian energy system rests on near-total dependence on natural gas for electricity generation, estimated at around 98% of the electricity mix.

This dependence creates an internal crowding-out effect: as domestic consumption rises, the volumes available for export mechanically decrease. This phenomenon limits Algeria's ability to respond to growing European demand since 2022, despite a favourable price context. In other words, Algeria's strategic centrality is accompanied by a structural constraint that limits its scope.

Moreover, export infrastructures are reaching high utilisation levels. The Medgaz and TransMed pipelines are operating at rates close to their maximum capacity, with limited expansion margins in the short term. Liquefaction capacities, concentrated at Arzew and Skikda, offer additional flexibility, but they are affected by technical constraints and maintenance episodes that reduce their operational efficiency.

In this context, the question of increasing production arises with acute force. Sonatrach's stated targets aim for production of 130 to 140 billion m³ by 2030. However, achieving this target depends on several uncertain variables, notably upstream investment levels, the attractiveness of the regulatory framework for foreign partners, and the ability to mobilise advanced technologies.

The development of shale gas appears as a medium-term strategic option. Algeria has substantial resources, among the highest in the world in terms of technically recoverable potential. Partnerships have been concluded between Sonatrach and the international majors ExxonMobil and Chevron, with a view to developing these resources. Nevertheless, beyond the announcement effects of the Algerian government, the contribution of shale gas to total exported volume would only become significant in the medium term — between 5 and 10 years — and only subject to a strengthening of diplomatic ties between Algiers and Washington.

Tunisia: a systemic and multidimensional energy vulnerability

Tunisia constitutes a particularly illuminating case of the differentiated effects of gas in an asymmetric energy system. Unlike Algeria, it is neither a major producer nor a dominant actor, but a state heavily dependent on imports and structurally vulnerable to regional market developments.

This vulnerability rests first on the structure of the energy mix. More than 95% of Tunisian electricity is generated from natural gas, making it one of the world's electricity systems most dependent on a single energy source. This dependence is all the more problematic in that national gas production is in decline, due to the gradual depletion of fields and a lack of investment in exploration.

As a result, Tunisia is increasingly dependent on imports, primarily from Algeria. This dependence is estimated at between 60 and 70% of total gas supply. It places the country in a position of strong exposure to Algiers' political and commercial decisions, as well as to fluctuations in international prices.

The gas effect also manifests itself at the macroeconomic level. The energy bill represents between 6 and 8% of Tunisian GDP, which constitutes a major constraint on public finances. In a context of economic fragility and budgetary tensions, this energy dependence limits the state's room for manoeuvre and accentuates its vulnerability to external shocks.

Furthermore, Tunisia plays a transit role in the regional energy system, via the TransMed pipeline. This role gives it a strategic importance that contrasts with its economic vulnerability. The transit fee, estimated at around 5 to 7% of transported volumes, provides the country with privileged access to part of the Algerian gas. However, this mechanism does not transform Tunisia into an autonomous actor. The gas received is mainly destined for domestic consumption and does not allow for significant resale on regional markets.

This situation illustrates a form of asymmetric interdependence. While Tunisia depends on Algerian gas for its energy supply, Algeria likewise depends on Tunisian territory for the transit of part of its exports to Europe. However, this dependence is of a different nature. For Tunisia, it is existential; for Algeria, it is functional. This asymmetry confers a strategic advantage on Algiers in the bilateral relationship.

Finally, the gas effect in Tunisia also manifests itself in the electricity sector. The country has become a net importer of electricity, with cross-border flows estimated at around 5% of national consumption. This evolution further reinforces energy dependence and underscores the limits of the current system.

Overall, the gas effect in Tunisia can be interpreted as a factor of structural fragilisation. It reveals the limits of a poorly diversified energy model and underscores the urgency of a transition towards more sustainable sources less dependent on imports.

Europe: reconfiguration of dependencies and a new energy geography

For the European Union, the gas effect translates into a profound reconfiguration of energy dependencies. Domestic production, estimated at around 30 to 35 billion m³, covers only a limited fraction of total consumption, which amounts to approximately 330 billion m³. This situation structures a durable dependence on imports.

The war in Ukraine marked a turning point by triggering a rapid reduction in dependence on Russian gas. However, this diversification has not translated into an overall decrease in dependence, but rather into its reconfiguration. Europe has turned to new suppliers, notably the United States for LNG and Algeria for pipeline supplies.

In this context, Algeria occupies a central position, particularly for Southern European countries. Italy, which has substantially increased its imports of Algerian gas since 2022, has become one of Algiers' principal energy partners. Spain depends largely on gas delivered via Medgaz, while France is reinforcing its recourse to Algerian LNG.

This reconfiguration of flows is accompanied by a transformation in the logics of energy security. Whereas diversification was historically conceived as a multiplication of sources, it now tends to be thought of in terms of the resilience of corridors. In other words, energy security increasingly depends on the stability of infrastructure and the political relationships that underpin it.

This evolution poses significant challenges. On the one hand, it exposes Europe to the political and economic risks of supplier and transit countries. On the other hand, it reinforces the geopolitical dimension of energy, making energy relations a central element of foreign policies.

Finally, the gas effect in Europe must be analysed in light of the energy transition. The reduction in gas consumption observed since 2022, linked to energy efficiency policies and the development of renewables, does not call into question structural dependence in the short term. Gas remains a key element of the European energy mix, particularly for electricity generation and industry.

European energy security now rests less on the multiplication of sources than on the resilience of corridors.

The 2026 energy crisis confirms not so much a rupture as an acceleration of structural dynamics at work since the early 2020s. It highlights a profound transformation of European energy geography, now marked by a rebalancing of dependencies and a revaluation of regional corridors at the expense of strictly globalised LNG logics. In this new context, the Central Mediterranean asserts itself as a strategic space of the first order, at the crossroads of energy security, political stability and geopolitical reconfiguration.

The analysis of gas corridors reveals that infrastructures are not mere technical supports, but instruments of power structuring relations between producers, transit states and consumers. Algeria, drawing on its geographic proximity, its historical anchoring in European markets and its reputation for reliability, appears as a pivotal actor in this reconfiguration. However, this centrality is bounded by significant internal constraints, foremost among them the sustained growth of domestic demand and the relative saturation of export capacities. In this sense, Algeria embodies a strategic supplier whose room for manoeuvre remains limited in the short term, unless structural transformations of its productive apparatus are undertaken.

In parallel, Tunisia illustrates the vulnerabilities specific to transit states in an asymmetric energy system. Its structural dependence on gas, combined with the fragility of its macroeconomic balances, makes it a critical link in the Euro-Mediterranean corridor. While its role in the transit of Algerian gas grants it real strategic importance, this does not translate into greater energy or political autonomy. On the contrary, it falls within a logic of asymmetric interdependence, where Tunisian dependence remains existential in nature, while Algeria's remains essentially functional. Within this framework, securing Tunisian supplies appears conditioned on several factors: the stability of Algerian flows, Algiers' ability to maintain its exports despite the pressure of domestic demand, and Tunisian financial soundness sufficient to sustain its energy bill. In the absence of a significant increase in Algerian production, a risk of strain on Tunisian supplies cannot be ruled out, particularly during peak demand periods, which reinforces the country's structural vulnerability.

For the European Union, this configuration reflects the emergence of a new Mediterranean dependence. The diversification undertaken since 2022 has reduced exposure to Russian gas, but it has not eliminated structural dependence on imports. It has redeployed it, by reinforcing the weight of regional suppliers such as Algeria. In this context, European energy security now rests less on the multiplication of sources than on the resilience of corridors — that is, on the stability of infrastructures and of the political spaces they cross.

By 2030, the Central Mediterranean should thus remain a structuring space of European energy security, within which Algeria consolidates its centrality, Tunisia confirms its role as a critical link, and Europe remains dependent on the stability of its supply corridors. This configuration opens up several possible trajectories: